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THE STATE OF ISRAEL’S
CONSTITUTION; A COMPARISON
OF CIVILIZED NATIONS
Mark Goldfeder
ABSTRACT
The art of constitution-making is never one-dimensional.
In regard to the United States’ model, it has recently been argued that “[d]espite the enormous literature on the critical period, including the foreign affairs imperatives behind the
movement for reform, it is not fully understood that the animus
behind the reform effort that culminated in the new Constitution was a desire to ensure that the United States would be in
a position to meet its international commitments and thereby
earn international recognition.”1 While there are obvious differences, and while this concept is perhaps of even greater importance and more poignantly felt for a nation that has so long
been plagued with issues of de facto and de jure recognition,
many of the same factors that would make it incomplete to
view the purpose of the American Constitution as a strictly internal document hold true for our strongest ally in the Middle
East. After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the
young country experienced diplomatic isolation and Arab
League boycotts. Today, Israel has diplomatic ties with 154 out
of the other 191 member states of the United Nations, as well
as with non-member Vatican City. This paper argues that the
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1 David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition 116 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper
No. 222), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/222.
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developing Israeli constitutionalism (this term is used broadly
to cover not only the Basic Laws but also the quasiconstitutional founding documents and semi-constitutional
proclamations of the Israeli Supreme Court) is also to a large
extent about facilitating the admission of the new nation into
the community of civilized states. From treaty making and
economic development, to existential security issues, Israel
recognized early on that it needed to quickly develop a strong
and responsible federal government capable of enforcing compliance. It established a judiciary with capability of maintaining and enforcing the law of nations, and even challenging the
state itself. More importantly though, while in the American
model the framers were looking for and trying to gain trust in
an economic sense, the Israelis are more focused on gaining international respect, especially on civil rights issues.
Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic policy.

-Henry Kessinger
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Professors David Golove and Daniel Hulseboch seminal
article, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution,
the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, they argue that the animating purpose of the American
Constitution was, in a large part, to facilitate the admission of
the new nation into the European-centered community of “civilized states.”2 Achieving international recognition, which entailed legal and practical acceptance on an equal footing, was a
major aspiration of the founding generation, and creating a
constitution was a key means of realizing that goal.3 Towards
the end of their piece, the authors observe that, “[t]he United
States was the first postcolonial republic in which constitutionmaking was inextricably linked to the pursuit of international
recognition, but it was not the last.”4 They go on to note that,
Id.
Id. at 101.
4 Id. at 223.
2
3
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“[b]ecause the United States was first, the connection between
the federal Constitution and international recognition may
shed light on constitution-making across the globe since 1787.
We are in no position now to trace this connection; that must
await further research, by ourselves and others.”5 This article
will attempt to trace that connection in regards to the constitutional movement and development in the modern State of Israel.
In accordance with A Civilized Nation, this paper argues
that the developing Israeli constitutionalism (and the term is
used here broadly to cover not only the Basic Laws of Israel,
but also the quasi-constitutional founding documents and semiconstitutional proclamations of the Israeli Supreme Court)6 has
not only been about domestic governing; but also, to a large extent, about facilitating the admission of the new nation into the
enlightened community of civilized states. There are obvious
differences between the founding of the United States and of
Israel. For instance, in the American model, the framers were
looking for and trying to gain trust in an economic sense, 7 while
the Israelis are more focused on gaining international respect,
especially on civil rights issues. Yet, this concept of national
citizenship is perhaps of even greater importance and more
poignantly felt for a nation that, like Israel, has so long been
Id.
Daniel J. Elazar, The Constitution of the State of Israel, JERUSALEM
CENTER FOR PUB. AFF., http://jcpa.org/dje/articles/const-intro-93.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (“By and large, modern political science has emphasized
the distinction between written and unwritten constitutions as basic to the
understanding of constitutionalism, citing the American constitution as the
prime example of the former and the British constitution as the prime example of the latter. That distinction has come under increasing criticism in recent years. Political scientists have pointed out that the American constitutional document cannot be understood on the basis of the plain text alone but
only as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States
and in light of various conventions and usages that have grown up in the
course of two hundred years. Similarly, the ‘unwritten’ British constitution is
built around a series of fundamental documents (from the Magna Carta to
the reform of the House of Lords after World War II) as hallowed in their way
as their American counterpart.” Israeli constitutionalism, as it stands, falls
somewhere in between.); see also Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-30450
00244.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
7 Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 105.
5
6
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plagued with issues of de facto and de jure recognition.8 As in
the American case, it would be incomplete to view the purpose
of the Israeli constitution as that of a strictly internal document.
We will adopt as our framework the “basic underlying dynamic” that Golove and Hulseboch identified for developing
constitutional governments, which broadly stated is the idea
that constitution-makers undertake their projects not only to
consolidate power at home, but also to gain recognition
abroad.9 “To do so, they incorporate commitments to international law in their domestic constitutions.”10 From treaty making and economic development to existential security issues, Israel recognized early on that it needed to quickly develop a
strong and responsible government capable of handling its responsibilities to other countries and with the capacity to enforce compliance.11 It also established a judiciary with the capability of maintaining and enforcing the law of nations and
even challenging the state, while at the same time attempting
to raise the country’s standing in the eyes of a watchful world. 12
Much like the Unites States, it all began with a Declaration.
II. THE FOUNDING AND THE EARLY DAYS
The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, adopted
on November 29, 1947 by the General Assembly of the United
Nations, recommended the termination of the British Mandate
for Palestine and the partition of the territory into two states,
one Jewish and one Arab.13 Part I Section B of the Partition
Plan called for both the emerging State of Israel and State of

8 See HOWARD M. SACHAR,
TO OUR TIME 310 (2007).

A HISTORY OF ISRAEL FROM THE RISE OF ZIONISM

Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 223.
Id.
11 See generally GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 3-9 (1993).
12 Id.
13 G.A. Res. 181 (II), at 131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947),
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the
%20Peace%20Process/UN%20General%20Assembly%20Resolution%20181.
9

10
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Palestine to adopt democratic constitutions. 14 The very first
foundational concept of Israeli constitutionalism was thus an
attempt to gain approval and acceptance in the international
arena.
Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which was adopted
unanimously by all the representatives of the newborn Jewish
state on May 14, 1948, expressly stated that the form of government in Israel would be based on a constitution. 15 The Declaration also provided for temporary institutions, meant to
serve until an elected Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution that would establish the permanent institutions of government.16 It stated that Israel was a Jewish state, and promised equal civil, political, and social rights to all of its citizens. 17
Several draft constitutions were prepared prior to formal independence, and one of them, composed by Leo Kohn, had even
been selected as the starting point for the deliberations,18 with
a final decision to come no later than October 1, 1948.19
Things, however, did not go exactly as planned.
As soon as the British Mandate ended, a violent war
erupted, temporarily pushing aside all thoughts of anything
but survival. “By the time elections were actually held in 1949,
the temporary organs were quick to transfer to the constituent

14 Id. at 135 (“The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission.”).
15 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948,
1 LSI 3 (1948) (Isr.) [hereinafter Declaration] (“WE DECLARE that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the
eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), and until the setting up
of the duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution, to be
drawn up by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the first day of
October, 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of
State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall constitute
the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called ‘Israel.’"), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Proc
ess/Declaration+of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See Amihai Radzyner, A Constitution for Israel: The Design of the Leo
Kohn Proposal, 27 J. EDUC. SOC. 369, 369 (1954).
19 See Declaration, supra note 15 (explaining that at least this is what
the Declaration called for).
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assembly all powers of regular legislation.”20 The elected body
thus became endowed with both legislative and constitutional
authority.21 The Constituent Assembly was elected on January
25, 1949, and it met for the first time on February 14, 1949.22
Two days later it passed the Transition Act of 1949, providing
that the legislature be called the Knesset and the Constituent
Assembly the First Knesset.23 In early 1950, a long debate was
held on the issue of whether or not to enact a constitution. 24
The governing coalition, headed by Prime Minister David Ben
Gurion, and including the religious parties, mostly opposed the
enactment of a constitution.25 While the religious parties’ fears
of having any legislation that could theoretically trump religious law are well documented, some of Ben Gurion's main reasons for opposing an entrenched constitution included a fear of
limits on the powers of government and the legislature and a
fear of judicial review over laws.26 Ben Gurion believed that a
young nation that was literally fighting for its life against external enemies, while at the same time contending with economic hardship and massive immigrant absorption, could not
allow itself the luxury of severe structural limitations on the
power of the government.27 The opposition, on the other hand,
20 Ruth L. Gavison, Legislatures and the Quest for a Constitution: The
Case of Israel, 11 CTR. FOR CONST. STUD. 345, 366 (2006).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Shlomo Guberman, The Development of the Law in Israel: The First 50
Years, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 19, 2000), http://www.mfa.
gov.il/MFA/Government/Branches+of+Government/JudicialDevelopment+of+
the+Law+in+Israel-+The+First+50+Yea.htm (noting that the change, was
not a mere matter of semantics; “it meant a departure from the initial determination to base the newly-established country on a democratic Constitution.” As we shall see, that departure was explained at the time as partially
resulting from the notion that the existing population of Israel ought not to
impose its ideals on the coming generations; “and therefore only when more
Jewish immigrants came to the country - only then - would the time be ripe
for drafting a Constitution.”).
24 Id.
25 See Ruth Gavison, The Controversy Over Israel’s Bill of Rights, 15 ISR.
Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 113 (1985), available at http://www.gavison.com/a2645the-controversy-over-israel-s-bill-of-rights (explaining this debate).
26 Id.
27 Ruth Gavison, A Constitution for Israel: Lessons from the American
Experiment, 12 AZURE 133, 146 (2002).
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wanted a constitution to protect democracy and human
rights.28
The debate ended with a practical agreement that came to
be known as the “Harari decision.”29 It stated, in principle,
that the process of creating a unified supreme constitution
would be postponed, and that the Knesset would instead pass a
number of essential “Basic Laws,” which would ultimately be
brought together in the form of a constitution.30 “The task of
crafting the Basic Laws in order to create a constitution was
given to a standing committee of the Knesset: the Committee
on Constitution, Law, and Justice.”31 Neither the status of the
Basic Laws nor the process and the timetable of their enactment were specified. 32 The proposal for the piecemeal writing
of the constitution meant that every Knesset, to this day, is also a constituent assembly that can enact Basic Laws. 33
The Harari decision was the first concrete step on the
journey towards an Israeli Constitution. In a very real and existential sense, it was also about foreign policy. In the ruling
party’s view, in order to be accepted as a nation, Israel first
needed to demonstrate its viability by shifting its focus away
from internal political conflicts while continuing to defend itself
from immediate threats.34 It is worth noting that Ben-Gurion’s
opinion was not meant to reflect a disregard for the importance
of human rights.35 Nevertheless, it was apparent that any constitution would have to take into account some very real and
Gavison, supra note 20, at 361.
DK (1950) 1743 (Isr.) (It was initiated by Knesset Member Yitzhar
Harari) (“The first Knesset directs the Constitutional, Legislative Judicial
Committee to prepare a draft Constitution for the State. The Constitution
shall be composed of separate chapters so that each chapter will constitute a
basic law by itself. Each chapter will be submitted to the Knesset as the
Committee completes its work, and all the chapters together shall be the
State's constitution.”).
30 See id.
31 Gavison, supra note 27, at 154.
32 Gavison, supra note 25, at 117
33 Elazar, supra note 6.
34 See DAFNA SHARFMAN, LIVING WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION; CIVIL RIGHTS
IN ISRAEL 42-44 (1993).
35 Id. at 41. At least if we are to believe his own numerous explanations
both in speech and in writing.
28
29
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very pressing security requirements. There was thus a fear of
two opposing dangers in writing a constitution at that moment:
on the one hand, the lack of legal flexibility necessary to cope
with the state of war, and on the other, a reluctance to adopt a
constitution which would not give due respect to human
rights.36 It was genuinely believed that a constitution of the
latter type would not serve as a deserving model for generations to come.37 For Israel then, not only the content, but even
the practical manner in which the Constitution could be written, was influenced and shaped by outside forces. The process
could not even begin until Israel felt that it had the luxury and
the peace of mind to be able to do it right.
III. THE JUDICIARY AS FRAMERS
If the Harari decision was step one, history has shown that
the founding of the Supreme Court of Israel, with its emerging
power of judicial review, was the second step in the establishment of an Israeli Constitution. During the Mandate period
when the British instituted their legal system; Magistrate’s
Courts, District Courts, and a Supreme Court were established.38 With the establishment of an independent State, the
Provisional Council became the legislative authority empowered to enact the laws, and in order to prevent a devastating
legal vacuum, the Council immediately decided that all the
laws prevailing before 1948 should continue to be in force, with
only slight modifications as prescribed by legislation.39 Judges
of the Supreme Court were appointed by the Provisional Government on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice and
subject to the approval of the Provisional Council of State.40
See id. at 45.
See Gavison, supra note 25, at 136-37.
38 See generally, Shmuel Orenshtein, Adv. Dir. of Legal Aid, & Michal
Cohen, Adv. Dept. of Advice & Legis., The Israeli Legal System and Current
Innovations in its Administration, Paper Presented at the Ministry of Justice,
Jerusalem (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.eipa.eu/modules/EuroMedJu
stice/Conferences/Istanbul_16_19Apr07/reports/10_Israel.pdf
39 Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 7, § 11 (1948)
(Isr.).
40 Courts (Transitional Provisions) Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 L.S.I. 23, §
1(c) (1948) (Isr.).
36
37

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/3

8

GOLDFEDERMCR (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/7/2013 5:43 PM

STATE OF ISRAEL’S CONSTITUTION

73

By virtue of this authority, on July 22, 1948, the first five
Supreme Court justices were appointed. 41 The Court was empowered to begin functioning in September 1948.42 It opened
its doors on September 15 and held its first hearing the very
next day.43 Today, the Court functions as the Supreme Court
of Civil Appeals, the Supreme Court of Criminal Appeals, and
the High Court of Justice. 44 As The High Court of Justice, it is
an administrative law court of first and last instance that has
the authority to enjoin public officials and other courts, award
compensation, and intervene in every case not within another
court’s jurisdiction in which it is “necessary to grant relief in
the interest of justice.”45
In the early years of the State, the Supreme Court interpreted the Declaration of Independence, and particularly the
“individual rights” clause,46 as incorporating the “founding
principles” of the State. Accordingly, the Court used the Declaration as a normative source in several decisions in which petitioners claimed an infringement of their rights and freedoms;
ruling that in cases where legislation may be interpreted in
several ways, the laws should be interpreted in a way consistent with the principles expressed in the Declaration.47 Utilizing this method, the Court struck down several governmental decisions because they contravened fundamental rights
enumerated in the Declaration. For example, in the famous
Kol Ha’am case, the Court guaranteed freedom of speech when
it invalidated a government decision to shut down a newspaper

41 Historical Background, THE STATE OF ISR., THE JUD. AUTHORITY, http://
elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/system/index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Basic Law: The Judicature, 5744-1984, 38 LSI 101, § 15 (1984) (Isr.).
46 Gavison, supra note 25, at 116 (“THE STATE OF ISRAEL . . . will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of
all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.”).
47 See Patricia J. Woods, The Ideational Foundations of Israel’s “Constitutional Revolution”, 62 POL. RES. Q. 811, 819-20 (2009).
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because of a controversial op-ed criticizing government policy. 48
In doing so, the Court stated that:
The system of laws under which the political institutions . . .
have been established and function is witness to the fact that this
is indeed a State founded on democracy. Moreover, the matters
set forth in the Declaration of Independence, especially as regards basing the State 'on the foundations of freedom' and securing freedom of conscience, mean that Israel is a freedom-loving
country. It is true that the Declaration “does not include any constitutional law laying down in fact any rule regarding the maintaining or repeal of any ordinances or laws” . . . but in so far as it
“expresses the vision of the people and its faith,” . . . we are
bound to pay attention to the matters set forth therein when we
come to interpret and give meaning to the laws of the state.49

While the Kol Ha’am decision did nullify an order promulgated
by the Minister of the Interior to close down the newspaper for
a few days, the Court still refused to accept the argument that
an actual statutory provision enacted by the Knesset, or even a
provision of the British Mandatory legislation that remained in
force, could be struck down just because it was in conflict with
a recognized individual right. 50 As Justice Z. Berenson famously put it:
The legal force [of the Declaration] exists in the [rule] that every
legal provision should be interpreted in its light and to the extent
possible, in keeping with its guiding principles and not contrary
thereto. However, when an explicit statutory measure of the
Knesset leaves no room for doubt, it should be honored even if inconsistent with the principles in the Declaration of Independence.51

Therefore, there was no sense of authoritative judicial review of
Knesset legislation at that time.
48 HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Interior 7 PD 871, 903
[1953] (Isr.).
49 Id. at 884.
50 See id.
51 E. Gutmann, The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Histo
ry/decind.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). Interestingly enough, it was actually Justice Berenson who wrote the first draft of what would become the
Declaration of Independence.
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The move towards judicial review took another small step
forward in 1984, when then newly elected Chief Justice Meir
Shamgar expounded on Kol Ha’am and wrote a rousing defense
of civil rights as related to embedded constitutional principles
in the Israeli legal system, despite the fact that for years the
State had avoided entrenching these constitutional principles
in a written constitution.52 While in Kol Ha-Am Justice
Agranat had almost poetically used the Declaration of Independence as an expression of the “spirit of the people,” and
thus figuratively, if not normatively, “binding” on the state (at
least until it stood in contradiction to the explicit current “will
of the people” as demonstrated by their elected officials),
Shamgar took the idea one step further.53 For Shamgar, the
idea that the Declaration embodied something greater than
“normal law” was a strong enough binding principle on its own
that it made a return to the debates over writing a constitution
practically moot. He wrote, “it will be enough . . . that there exists judicial-constitutional force to parts of the Declaration of
Independence, which gave expression to fundamental principles that reflect the existing judicial spirit in Israel.” 54
Shamgar and his followers came to view both Kol ha-Am and
the Declaration of Independence as documentation able and
worthy to support the spirit of justice and rights that would
otherwise be entrenched in a constitution.55 Although it did reflect an interesting shift in perspective, the majority of the
Court did not ever share that view.
Things began to change from another angle with the landmark case of Bergman v. Minister of Finance (1969).56 The very
first Basic Law, enacted in 1958, dealt with the Knesset com-

52

tion).

Woods, supra note 47, at 819-20 (discussing Shamgar’s evolving posi-

Id. at 819.
Id.
55 Id. at 819-20.
56 See generally Benjamin Akzin, Judicial Review of Statute, 4 ISR. L.
REV. 559 (1969) (translating HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance and
State Comptroller 23(1) PD 693 [1969] (Isr.)) (this case has often been referred to by scholars as “Israel’s Marbury v. Madison,” although to be fair
that term has also been used to describe Kol Ha’am and, as we shall soon see,
the Mizrahi Bank case).
53
54
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position, procedures, and rules. 57 Only one section of the law,
the section holding that elections in Israel will be “general, national, proportional and equal,” was entrenched; requiring a
special absolute majority of sixty 61 out of 120 Knesset members for its amendment.58 In Bergman, the High Court ruled
that a law violating the equality of elections, by not funding
new parties, could only be enacted with the consent of the special majority.59 Since the law in question had not been enacted
in that way, the Court invalidated it.60 In doing so, the Court
established the principle that in addition to invalidating administrative acts and governmental decisions that contradict
“constitutional” values, the Court has the power to void actual
Knesset legislation that violates a Basic Law.61 This has been
entrenched by a special majority, thus developing the beginnings of a very limited de facto power of judicial review.
While the Bergman decision was, in a certain sense, paradigm shifting, over the next several decades the explicit idea of
judicial review was invoked for only very specific reasons.
Courts could review laws that violated entrenched provisions,
not enacted with the proper majority, in the context of election
laws that touched on the Basic Law: The Knesset. 62 In short,
they almost never could review these laws. The Court continued to insist that even the non-entrenched Basic Laws were
just regular laws, and no one argued that the Bergman case by
itself meant that Israel now had a set of higher laws, or a constitution.63 Still, in the years following their experiment with
judicial review in Bergman, the Court did begin to increasingly
assert a form of judicial oversight in practice if not overtly, in
regard to administrative decisions, including executive and
military actions, over which it had heretofore not claimed ju-

Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958, 12 LSI 85 (1957-58) (Isr.).
Id. Regular legislation can be amended by an ordinary majority of present members.
59 Akzin, supra note 56, at 563-64.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See Robert A. Burt, Inventing Judicial Review: Israel and America, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 2013, 2046-47 (1988-1989).
63 See id.
57
58
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risdiction.64
The court’s expanding “activism” focused primarily on individual rights against governmental authorities, specifically
those including employee rights, freedom of speech, national
service, security, gender equality, religious freedom, and the
like.65 In 1972, for instance, the Court declared that military
laws do not have the same status as primary legislation. 66 Rather, military laws must be bound by international law. 67 In
the case of Khelou v. Government of Israel, the Court, acting in
its capacity as the High Court of Justice, not only used a form
of judicial review to check military decisions, but also established for the first time the idea of a constitutional-type appeal
to extra-statutory sources for legal interpretation in nothing
less than international law.68 In the words of Justice Kister,
‘“[t]he military commander in any enlightened state . . . must
act in accordance with the rules of international law which
set limits and boundaries to his authority.”’69
The Khelou decision famously granted standing to noncitizen residents in non-sovereign territories to file suit before
the Court.70 The use of international law as binding legal principle was thus established through Israeli Supreme Court
precedent in the 1970s, and may be an important component of
Israel’s developing constitutional tradition. 71 The fact that the
decision is quoted frequently by domestic and international
courts, and has been held up as a paradigm of the protection of
Woods, supra note 46, at 813.
Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 The appeal to legal sources outside of the domestic nation-state context
has created controversy in many country contexts, including, recently, the
United States, where discussion of international sources in legal decisions
was a subject of debate between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia. See Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, Debate at American University, Washington College of Law on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign
Court Decisions at American University (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript on file
with the Federal News Service), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/foc
us/news/1352357/posts; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
69 Burt, supra note 62, at 2032 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
70 See id. at 2032-33.
71 See id.
64
65
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habeas corpus rights, speaks volumes about what the incorporation of international law into underlying Israeli legal norms
has done and can continue to do for Israel’s international reputation and standing amongst the other “civilized” nations.72
“Attempts to enact more Basic Laws and complete the constitution continued throughout the 1970's.”73 Slowly, Basic
Laws began to cover most of the central organs of government.
Mostly, they reflected the existing structure of government organs and their relations, and were fairly uncontroversial. None
of the provisions of these Basic Laws were entrenched, and
everyone, from the Members of the Knesset to the members of
the Supreme Court, agreed that they did not form a unified
constitution.74 It became apparent that there were two main
stumbling blocks to the completion of a constitution: the enactment of an agreed upon basic Bill of Rights, and of an accompanying Basic Law; and legislation that would openly deal
with the issue of entrenchment, resolve the question of supremacy, and presumably, involve the creation of real and open
judicial review of the laws by the courts.75
In 1992, members of the Knesset, who supported the writing of a constitution and of a Bill of Rights, realized that their
chances were very slim to complete legislation of both Basic
Law Legislation and an accompanying Bill of Rights, and to
declare the combination as the Israeli constitution, entrenched
and supreme.76 Instead, in a Harari-like decision, the members
decided that the best way to proceed would be to divide the Bill
of Rights into separate Basic Laws, seeking to enact only those
that enjoyed a broad consensus first, and hoping that once the
basic structure was in place the rest would follow.77 The Knesset succeeded in gaining the consensus to pass two Basic Laws
on human rights that year; Basic Law: Human Dignity and

72 See, e.g., Brief for Bipartisan Coalition of Nat’l. & Int’l. Non-Gov’t. Org.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(No. 03-334), 2004 WL 96763.
73 Gavison, supra note 20, 368.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 370.
77 Id.
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Liberty,78 and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.79
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was fully entrenched,
requiring the special majority of sixty-one votes in the Knesset
to make changes.80 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
was not entrenched, and it contained an explicit provision
granting all prior existing legislation immunity from judicial
review.81 In regard to future legislation, however, although the
human rights laws did not specify judicial review, they did
both contain a section stating that all relevant authorities must
protect the rights enumerated, and that these rights could only
be infringed upon according to law and in a proportionate
manner; a limitation clause.82 Specifically, the bills stated
that, ”[t]here shall be no violation of rights under this Basic
Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel,
enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than
is required.”83 They also declared that human rights were to be
protected according to the values of “Israel as a Jewish and
democratic state.”84
A minimalist interpretation would have seen that clause as
another Declaration of Independence style add on; powerful
prose but with limited legal weight. A slightly less conservative approach might have taken that phrase as the weightgiving solidifier it was meant to be, and would have added the
two new Basic Laws to the short list of already entrenched
ones. However, Chief Justice Aharon Barak championed a
more radical and active interpretation of the new laws, declaring in the landmark case of Bank Mizrahi v. The Minister of
Finance85 that their enactment – and particularly the new limitation clause concept – signified the elevation of all Basic Laws
to supremacy over ordinary legislation.86 Although in this parId.
Id.
80 Id. at 367.
81 Id. at 370.
82 Id. at 371.
83 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454 § 4 (Isr.).
84 Id. § 2.
85 Gavison, supra note 20, at 371 (discussing CA 6821/93 Bank Hamirzachi v. Migdal Communal Village 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.)).
86 Id.
78
79
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ticular instance the Court concluded that the legislation being
challenged did not contravene the constitutional right to property articulated in Section 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, it nonetheless declared that, based on the limitation
clause, the Supreme Court now has the power to judicially review parliamentary legislation passed after the enactment of
each of the Basic Laws.87 This historic decision put all of the
Basic laws on top and established the modern Court’s practice
of real judicial review of statutes.88
What the Mizrahi decision means is that the Supreme
Court has done what everyone has been waiting for; it declared
that the eleven Basic Laws drafted over some forty five years
are, in fact, already a constitution.89 It has also granted itself
the power to analyze the constitutionality of laws and regulations, and to strike down new legislation that contradicts any Basic Law.90 Describing this “constitutional revolution,” Chief Justice Barak famously said that, ‘“[w]e are
creating our own foundations. In a way, I, as a Supreme Court
judge, have the sense that we are now the framers of our unwritten constitution.”’91
IV. CONSTITUTION-MAKERS UNDERTAKING PROJECTS TO GAIN
RECOGNITION ABROAD
Having established the structure of Israel’s constitution to
date and having established the Israeli Supreme Court as the
de facto framers of the Israeli-Constitution-to-be, we can now
take a closer look at some of the steps that the Court has taken. Before looking at the Israeli High Court in particular
though, it is important to place it in the proper context of the
particular international community of which it is a part.
Scholars have noted the “growing tendency of jurists and
Id. at 378.
Id.
89 Id. at 367 (referring to CA 6821/93 Bank Hamirzachi v. Migdal Communal Village 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.)).
90 Id.
91 RAPHAEL COHEN ALMAGOR, THE BOUNDARIES OF LIBERTY AND
TOLERANCE: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST KAHANISM IN ISRAEL 176 (1994) (citations
omitted).
87
88
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human rights activists from different countries to identify
themselves as part of a ‘unified international community.”’92
Harold Koh, for instance, points to the role of transnational issue networks and activists who trigger processes of nationalization of international law.93 Others claim that this transjudicial communication is seen not only in the application of international norms, but also in the recourse to comparative law,
particularly in the area of constitutional law.94 This is especially important for Israel because, existing as it does without a
fully written constitution, international law actually has the
potential to affect not only the interpretation, but also the ongoing shaping of that document. Indeed, as we shall see, it arguably already has.
By way of background, under Israeli law norms of customary international law are applied in domestic courts, except
where inconsistent with domestic legislation; whereas norms of
conventional international law are enforced only if incorporated
in domestic law by legislation.95
A judicial desire to resolve the seeming disparity between Israel’s
obligation to respect international conventions to which it is a
party and its failure to adopt their norms in its legislation, has
resulted in an interpretive approach stating that statutes should
be construed, as much as possible, as conforming to international

92 Daphne Barak-Erez, The International Law of Human Rights and
Constitutional Law: A Case Study of an Expanding Dialogue, 2 INT’L. J.
CONST. L. 611, 612 (2004), available at http://www.tau.ac.il/law/barakerez/arti
cles/icon.pdf.
93 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2658 (1997), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/f
ss_papers/2101; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 649 (1998), available at http://digitalcommons.la
w.yale.edu/fss_papers/2102.
94 See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of
Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 542 (1988), available at http://heinonline.
org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/clr88&div=29&g_sent=1&collection=jou
rnals.
95 The traditional justification for the distinction between customary and
treaty-based international law was based on the principle of separation of
powers. Treaties are made by the government, and not by the legislature. If
they had the force of law the government could have the power to legislate
with no involvement of the legislature.
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customary and treaty-based law.96

It is also important to briefly mention the status of Israel’s
reputation internationally, particularly on the civil rights and
freedoms front. For quite some time, Israel has considered the
international legal arena as another battlefield where its legitimacy is constantly being challenged.97 For years, Israel has
had to contend with a plethora of anti-Israel resolutions passed
in the United Nations General Assembly and its constituent
organizations. The best-known example was Resolution 3379
of November 10, 1975, which concluded with the phrase: “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.”98 The resolution also condemned Zionism “as a threat to world peace and
security,” and called “upon all countries to oppose this racist
and imperialist ideology.”99 The automatic majority in favor of
the Arab nations in the United Nations has left Israel with little or no maneuvering space and dependent on an American veto in the UN Security Council.
Perhaps due in part to its location and its particular security concerns, Israel’s movements are scrutinized and criticized
more than almost any other country. So, it is no wonder that
when looking to interpret, if not to form, its brand new constitution, Israel would stake a great claim to being a part of the
international legal world and tradition of protecting human
rights. Explicitly making this point, Chief Justice Barak, in his
treatise on legal interpretation, stated that ‘“the international
conventions on human rights to which Israel is a party should
be given a special interpretive status, because they reflect the
consensus of the international community to which Israel aspires to belong on an equal standing.”’100 This is why Israel has
96

Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 615.

97 Arieh J. Kochavi, Israel and the International Legal Arena, 25 J. ISR.
HIST. 223, 223 (2006), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108
0/13531040500502866 #preview.
98 U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2400th plen. mtg. at 84, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2400
(Nov. 10, 1975).
99 Id. (noting that on December 16,1991 the UN General Assembly revoked Resolution 3379, following a diplomatic battle that began when Israel
conditioned its participation in the Madrid Peace Conference on the revocation of this resolution.).
100 Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 615 n.20 (citations omitted).
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increasingly accepted international law in order to gain international acceptance.
The Iraqi Detainees case, decided under Barak, is one of
the first cases where international law played a part since the
Court adopted its newer, more active jurisprudence.101 Petitioners were Iraqi citizens who were arrested soon after they
had crossed the Israeli border. 102 They were kept in detention
with an eye to deporting them to a third country. In their petition to the High Court, the detainees argued that they were entitled to be treated as refugees and therefore demanded prohibition against deportation to countries in which their lives or
their freedom would be threatened.103 They also sought to be
released from detention until their deportation materialized. 104
The Israeli Supreme Court accepted the view that the power to
deport should be exercised in line with the limitations posed by
Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,105 and ordered the authorities to reconsider their decisions.
Another important decision in our line of cases was the socalled Torture case,106 “which raised the question of whether
the Israeli General Secret Service could use physical measures,
such as deprivation of sleep, shackling and vigorous shaking,
101 Id. at 623 (referring to HCJ 4702/94 Al-Tai v. Minister of Interior
49(3) PD 843 [1994] (Isr.)).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 3, Apr. 22, 1954,
189 U.N.T.S. 137. (explaining the prohibition of expulsion or return
(“refoulement”);
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler ") a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by
a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger
to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of that country.).
106 Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 623 (referring to HCJ 5100/94 Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 53(4) PD 817
[1999] (Isr.)).
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for purposes of interrogating suspected terrorists.” 107 The
Court, in one of its landmark precedents, answered in the negative.108 While the formal basis for the decision was the principle of legality, as the General Secret Service was not authorized by Israeli law to use physical force while conducting
investigations, it also drew heavily on the international norm
that clearly mandates the prohibition of torture.109 Chief Justice Barak stressed that at the international level, Israel was
obligated to refrain from torture, and that this prohibition was
“absolute and without exceptions.”110
Moving ever closer towards the constitutionalization in Israel of internationally accepted norms and rights, when the
question of the legality of charging parents supplementary fees
for children’s high school education came before the Court, the
policy was overruled based on the concept of the right to (free)
education.111 In addition to Israeli sources that talked about
this right, Justice Prokacia cited several international documents such as the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Convention on Human
Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
supported his conclusion. 112
Building on the above, the most definitively important case
in this context was the petition of an organization representing
families of children with Down syndrome.113 In Poria Ilit
Committee v. Minister of Education, the petitioners argued that
the state must cover the expenses of the special assistance that
a group of children with Down syndrome needed when they enrolled in regular schools.114 The state, however, argued that
107
108

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
111 Id. at 625.
112 Id.
113 Ran Hirschl, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and Progressive
Change: A Rejoinder to Mcclain and Fleming, 84 TEX. L. REV. 471, 591, 507
n.109 (2005).
114 Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 626 (referring to HCJ 4363/00 Committee of Poriya Ilit v. Minister of Education 56(4) PD 203 [2004] (Isr.)).
109
110
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they only needed to finance their special needs in special education classes. 115 Justice Dorner decided to accept the petition
based on the “unwritten constitutional right” to education.116
Among the sources cited for establishing this Israeli right were
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 117 In this context, Justice Dorner used the presumption of compatibility of national
law with the international obligations of the state to say that
the state must inherently contain within it those same internationally recognized rights. 118 The Court thereby elevated international rights and standards to new internal and domestic
constitutional heights.119
V.

CONCLUSION

In short, the new jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme
Court has attached increasing significance to norms of international law, even citing provisions of international instruments
that have not ever been incorporated into domestic legislation,
and going so far as establishing and recognizing unwritten constitutional givens. In return for the gifts that international law
has contributed to its constitutional corpus, the Court has
handed down precedent setting decisions in areas such as detainee rights120 and targeted killings.121 These decisions have
Id.
Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 622-23.
121 Compare HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel
v. The Government of Israel 56(5) PD 834 [2006] (Isr.), with Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Marko Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law in the War on Terror: comparing Hamdan and the
Israeli Targeted Killings Case, 89 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 373, 393
(2007) (“The paradox that therefore emerges from comparing these two decisions is that Hamdan, the one which is on its face more favorable to the petitioners, might actually be less so in the long term. The Israeli Supreme Court
is clearly superior to its US counterpart in applying humanitarian law to the
phenomenon of terrorism, and it is even more so in its application of human
rights law. This might actually prove to be the most enduring quality of the
115
116
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dealt with some of the day’s toughest questions and have paved
the way for future thought and international development. 122
In doing so, the Court, and Israel as its sponsor, has participated in the complex processes of dialogue and inspiration within
the international community of judges and jurists; contributing
to the setting of standards for the protection of human rights in
both Israel and the world and elevating Israel’s status to being
recognized as one of the “enlightened” or civilized nations at
the table, at least in the area of human rights jurisprudence. 123
As Golove and Hulsebosch noted in regard to the early
United States, recognition “brings more than legal status. It also has powerful existential dimensions.”124 The desire for
recognition, as Clifford Geertz observes, unites the vast majority of postcolonial nations. “[T]he peoples of the new states,”
Geertz argued:
Are simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives—the
desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts,
hopes, and opinions “matter,” and the desire to build an efficient,
dynamic modern state. The one aim is to be noticed: it is a search
for an identity, and a demand that the identity be publicly
acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of the self as
“being somebody in the world.” The other aim is practical: it is a
demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effec-

Targeted Killings judgment: that it shows so clearly how the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law can be a two-way street, and
how that relationship can be far more complex than is usually thought.”). See
generally Anthony Dworkin, Israel’s High Court on Targeted Killing: A Model
for the War on Terror, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.cri
mesofwar.org/onnews/news-highcourt.html.
122 J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: Targeted Killings
Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1073 (2002).
123 See Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 631 (depicting that while the Court
still struggles with questions in regard to its willingness to limit government
action in the disputed territories, they are undeniably at the forefront of the
challenge that the international world of law is facing; updating the concepts
of internal law and the Geneva Conventions to fit a war on terror. Since Israel has not yet completed formulating its constitution, international law has
the potential at this stage to inspire the process by imbuing human rights
with meaning, and to influence the drafting of future Basic Laws.).
124 Golove and Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 224.
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tive political order, [and] greater social justice.125

After the establishment of the State in 1948, Israel, alone
and inexperienced, was forced to endure diplomatic isolation
and harsh Arab League boycotts.126 Today, Israel has diplomatic ties with 159 out of the other 192 member states of the
United Nations, as well as with non-member Vatican City and
the European Union.127 While there are many factors that
have gone into this newfound level of acceptance, early Israeli
constitutionalism, especially the incorporation of international
norms and rights into fundamental Israeli national jurisprudence as a method and way of foreign policy, has gone a long
way towards facilitating Israel’s admission into the community
of civilized states. Not only has Israel established and enshrined greater and clearer protections for its own human
rights issues, Geertz’s second aim, is that Israel has also contributed to the conversation and come to be recognized for its
own unique talents and expertise. Its Courts are quoted in our
courts as “somebody in the world.”128
As with the America of the 1780s, internally, Israeli society is deeply divided on key issues, but it has guaranteed its citizens levels of political freedom, welfare, and education unknown in the region.129 While Israel is host to a number of
groups seeking to change the country in accordance with their
own visions, these groups all share an interest in common; that
125 Id. (quoting Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial
Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States, in CLIFFORD GEERTZ, OLD
SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA
105 (1963)).
126 Israel’s Bilateral Relations, Israel’s Diplomatic Missions Abroad: Status of Relations, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/for
eign%20relations/bilateral%20relations/ (last visited Mar. 10 2013).
127 Id.
128 See generally, Israel's Bilateral Relations, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreign%20relations/bilateral%20relation
s/ (last visited Mar. 10 2013) (noting that Israel is still very much at odds
with much of the civilized world in regard to the application of specific international law, particularly in the disputed territories. They are, however, at
least genuinely considered to be part of the conversation, and worth talking
to, which, for the purposes of this paper, is definitive recognition.).
129 Gavison, supra note 25, at 135; see generally Donna E. Arzt, Growing
a Constitution: Reconciling Liberty and Community in Israel and the United
States, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 256-63 (1994).
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Israel should continue to secure their basic rights. 130 Israel today, fragmented and strife-ridden, may at times seem farther
than ever from seeing a constitutional process through, and the
sense of crisis that has enveloped the country since negotiations with the Palestinians collapsed in October 2000 tends to
direct attention to issues that seem more urgent.131 Outside of
the country, recent polls show that Israel is still viewed negatively by many.132 Nevertheless, it is precisely difficult times
such as these that reveal the pressing need for a constitution,
and that are most likely to precipitate its creation.133 Only in
these moments is the need most keenly felt to forge and finalize
one basic document, a document that would create a shared political framework and provide a basis and starting point for
both internal domestic disputes and international comparison
in the international community of civilized nations.

Gavison, supra note 25, at 135.
Id.
132 Views of Europe Slide Sharply in Global Poll, While Views of China
Improve, GLOBESCAN (May 10, 2012), http://www.globescan.com/commentaryand-analysis/press-releases/press-releases-2012/84-press-releases-2012/186views-of-europe-slide-sharply-in-global-poll-while-views-of-chinaimprove.html.
133 Gavison, supra note 25, at 135.
130
131
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